States with direct democracy routinely ask voters to modify their states' laws and constitutions and to authorize the raising of billions of dollars in bonds and taxes. In recent elections, voters in many American states have also voted on important social policies that redefine civil liberties within their state. Do voters know enough about these social policies to make an informed decision? The common wisdom is that when choosing between candidates, voters rely on information shortcuts in lieu of extensive knowledge about the issues. Unlike candidate elections, however, ballot measures lack some useful information shortcuts such as party identification. Using data from an election survey, we test the hypothesis that voters use shortcuts to make reasoned decisions on two ballot measures central to today's policy debates: California's Proposition 4 (2008) on parental notification for abortion and Proposition 8 (2008) on same-sex marriage. We show that voters do not use cues universally, and furthermore, the amount of factual information a voter possesses has almost no effect on her decisions.
Introduction
Initiatives and referenda routinely require the average voter to make complicated policy decisions. Indeed, direct democracy often asks voters to ratify laws or constitutional amendments on the key political issues of the day, such as taxes, debt, immigration, abortion, and same-sex marriage. Increasingly, ballot measures have focused on essential civil liberties questions. Consider California's 2008 general election: voters defined marriage as requiring opposite-sex partners and decided that minors should not be required to notify their parents before receiving an abortion. These two examples are hardly alone. It is now common for voters who reside in states with direct democracy to alter their state's constitution to limit or increase the rights available to the citizens of that state (Lupia et al. 2010) . Indeed, ballot measures are the new weapon of choice on the frontline of the "culture war."
But do initiatives and referenda ask too much of voters? In many elections, the demands of direct democracy may be overwhelming. Again, consider the 2008 California general election: Residents of Los Angeles County voted on twelve statewide propositions and an additional 48 local and countywide measures. Direct democracy required voters of Los Angeles to evaluate at least twelve, and in some districts more than twenty, abstruse policy proposals in addition to selecting a president, a senator, and representatives for federal, state, county, city, and other local offices. The presence of multiple ballot measures in any given election is commonplace in California, and California is not the only state in which ballots resemble telephone directories. Asking voters to evaluate complicated constitutional questionsespecially ones that define civil liberties -may be demanding too much from election-fatigued voters.
knowledgeable and trustworthy. Lupia and Lupia and McCubbins (along with Popkin 1994) have shown that voters can make reasoned decisions -in both representative and direct democracy -despite their information deficiencies.
In a recent article, Burnett, Garrett, and McCubbins (2010) found no evidence that familiarity with the core facts behind a ballot measure or knowledge of the position of prominent cue-giver caused voters to vote differently compared to those who possessed neither kinds of information. This evidence stands in stark contrast to Lupia's (1994) and Karp's (1998) conclusion that voters routinely use information -including cues -to make decisions and raises two important questions: When and how often are voters informed about the policy choices they face on the ballot? And, when and under what conditions do voters use elite endorsements in direct democracy? We show that cue-givers sometimes succeed in influencing only a subset of voters in any given election. We also show that having specific knowledge about a ballot measure does not always influence a voter's decision. This is surprising given that previous research (Bartels 1996; Lau and Redlawsk 1997) shows that information often affects voters' decisions. Additional studies are necessary to move toward a general understanding of what voters know about ballot measures and when knowledge of facts and elite endorsements will influence voters in direct democracy.
Voters and Competent Decisions in Direct Democracy
We build on the agency-theory framework of Lupia and McCubbins (1998, Chapters 2-5) , who argue that voters (whom they call "principals") can use information from cue-givers (whom they call "speakers") when the cue-giver meets the following common-knowledge conditions: (1) the voter believes that the cue-giver shares a common interest over policy outcomes, or, lacking that, the cue-giver must undertake an observable and costly action to communicate a voting cue to the voter, or some external force or forces are strong enough to substitute for common interest (there is a penalty for lying or a threat of verification, thereby making the cue-giver trustworthy); and (2) the voter perceives the cue-giver to be knowledgeable about the subject matter (thus, the cue-giver is believed to have the knowledge the voter desires).
Of course, the cue-giver can persuade the voter and thus change the voter's policy choice only when the voter is uncertain about which option is better (Lupia and McCubbins 1998, 55) .
While information shortcuts have great potential to help voters make decisions, the realities of political campaigns place limits the ability of cue-givers to persuade voters. For instance, Garrett and McCubbins (2008) find that many information shortcuts fail to meet the two basic conditions set forth by Lupia and McCubbins, with or without the existence of external persuasive forces, and are therefore not useful. On the other hand, Boudreau (2009a) , in work that parallels the work of Lupia and McCubbins (1998) and Gigerenzer (2000; 2007; , Gigerenzer and Selten (2001) and Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1999) , uses experimental evidence to show that unsophisticated voters can use cues so successfully that they can, in some instances, out-perform more knowledgeable (sophisticated) voters. In a related study, Boudreau (2009b) validates the Lupia and McCubbins (1998, 55) hypothesis that an individual may ignore credible cues if she thinks she is capable of making an independent decision (see also Zaller 1992) . Boudreau et al. (2010) show that for voters to become informed, voting cues must be both cheap to acquire and the problems have to be easy enough for voters to understand, thereby allowing voters to use their knowledge of cues to make a reasoned choice.
In sum, information shortcuts can work, but it is unclear how often elections meet the conditions for voter persuasion.
Many scholars now incorporate information shortcuts as an essential component of vote choice models. These models assume that voters successfully and routinely overcome their information deficiencies by relying on simple cues (cf. Popkin 1994) . Indeed, shortcuts can work well in elections that allow party and incumbent labels on the ballot. Party labels demonstrate a common interest (Downs 1957, Ch. 8) , and incumbency signals to voters that one option has knowledge from experience (for a different perspective, see Bartels 1996) . Moreover, these shortcuts are available on the printed ballot, which reduces the transaction costs for voters to access these cues. As a result, we should expect voters to use party and incumbency shortcuts to evaluate candidates for national and many state offices (e.g., Jacobson 2008).
By contrast, initiatives and referenda do not come with voting cues printed on the ballot.
In order for voters to use cues to make reasoned choices with respect to ballot measures, the following must be true: (1) the source of the cue and the communication environment satisfies both of Lupia and McCubbins' conditions for persuasion, (2) voters must have learned about the voting cue before they vote, and (3) voters recall the voting cue when they make their choice.
Yet, voters are cognitive misers and many do not perform extensive searches for information about politics (see, e.g., Downs 1957, Ch. 11) . Because the cues for ballot measures are not available on the ballot (although they may sometimes be found in the voter information guide), we should expect that voters will employ fewer information shortcuts in their vote choices over ballot measures than they do in their votes for national or statewide candidates. Lupia (1994; see also Karp 1998 ) is the first to offer empirical support showing that voters can use information shortcuts to approximate a fully informed vote for a ballot measure.
Lupia conducted an exit survey of Los Angeles voters during the 1988 general election in California to measure the electorate's awareness of prominent endorsers and opponents of five related ballot measures. In his survey, Lupia finds that voters who knew the information shortcuts (cues presented by endorsers) were able to use the cues to arrive at reasoned decisions on the five initiatives he surveyed (all of the measures dealt with car insurance reform). As Lupia and Matsusaka note about the seminal work, "Such evidence supports the claim that voters with apparently low levels of political information can use information shortcuts to emulate the voting behavior they would have exhibited if they were as informed as the best-informed persons in the survey" (2004: 468). As Bartels (1996) observes and Lupia and Matsusaka (2004) confirm, however, very little empirical evidence examines whether voters, in practice, actually substitute information shortcuts for extensive factual knowledge. Despite the dearth of empirical evidence, scholars have prematurely designated Lupia's findings the conventional wisdom in the study of direct democracy. Recent empirical work on the topic, however, has begun to challenge Lupia's results (Burnett, Garrett, and McCubbins 2010; Burnett and Parry 2012) .
We test whether and how often voters use voting cues to compensate for their lack of factual knowledge about ballot measures for two initiatives. Building on Lupia (1994) and using the framework of Lupia and McCubbins (1998) , we propose the following hypothesis:
H1:
In lieu of full information, voters use information shortcuts in the form of endorsers' cues to arrive at reasoned choices.
In addition, we examine the effects of factual knowledge on vote choice. Similar to Lupia (1994) who found that knowledge of a cue was as effective at informing voters' decisions as factual knowledge, we expect a similar outcome. Similarly, where our expectation is that knowledge of a fact will lead voters to better decisions (e.g., Bartels 1996) .
H2:
Voters who have specific knowledge about a ballot measure will use that knowledge to arrive at reasoned choices more often when compared with the baseline category.
Data
We use data collected during California's general election on November 4, 2008, to test our hypotheses. During this election, we assessed voters' knowledge about two contentious propositions on the ballot, including their knowledge of endorsements from prominent cuegivers. We also asked respondents to report their vote choices and demographic information (e.g., party identification, income, education). We trained student volunteers to take interviews from voters as they exited the polling both. We surveyed thirteen polling locations that covered nineteen precincts. Our student volunteers collected 1,002 complete interviews and received 1,051 refusals, yielding a cooperation rate of 49 percent. We instructed our student volunteers to ask every other exiting voter for an interview to randomize our sample.
We asked respondents about two initiatives that would have amended the California state constitution. Proposition 4 was an initiative that required medical officials to notify the parent or legal guardian of an unemancipated minor at least 48 hours before performing an abortion.
Proposition 4 did not require parental or guardian consent. The initiative allowed for a number of exceptions: when the minor showed convincing evidence of maturity; when a court deemed that forgoing notification is in the best interest of the minor; when the parent(s) or guardian(s) had given previous consent; or in the case of a medical emergency. Additionally, Proposition 4 would have instituted mandatory reporting requirements for physicians and penalties for noncompliance.
Proposition 4 was a controversial initiative that had many proponents and opponents. and not parental consent for a minor to receive an abortion. Voters who had followed the campaign or had paid close attention to the campaign materials should have learned the correct answer to this question.
For Proposition 8, we assessed whether voters understood that constitutional amendments via the initiative process only require a simple majority to pass. Specifically, we asked: 5) As a constitutional amendment, what percent of the vote is required to pass Proposition 8, eliminating same-sex marriage? (The correct answer is a "majority" of voters)
Perhaps an attempt to mobilize their supporters, the opposition campaign emphasized how easy it was to change the constitution throughout their campaign. Thus, voters who followed the campaign or were familiar with California's laws regarding the initiative process should have learned the correct answer to this question.
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By asking factual knowledge questions, we can separate voters who have deep knowledge of a ballot measure from voters who only have knowledge of the information shortcut (the well-known cues). Similar to Lupia before us, including these measures allows us to estimate whether factual knowledge or knowledge of a cue had any effect on vote choice. We provide the ballot summary of each proposition in Appendix A.
Research Design and Methods
We use a post-test-only non-equivalent group design to test our hypothesis. Our design uses responses to the factual knowledge and information shortcut questions to create variables that estimate the effect of information on vote choice. Unlike Lupia (1994) who was able to assume the direction of his information shortcuts (he assumed that voters disliked lawyers and insurance companies), we must add a "direction" to our information variables (e.g., Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989). We expect that information -especially elite endorsements -will affect subgroups of voters differently. Our ballot measures deal with abortion (Proposition 4) and same-sex marriage (Proposition 8), two quintessential ideological issues. For example, we anticipate that voters who are liberal will view the endorsements from Planned Parenthood, the Democratic Party, and the Republican Party differently when compared to conservative voters. Therefore, we add a "direction" to our information variables by interacting them with our respondents' self-reported ideology. Our approach is similar to Karp (1998) who adds a direction to his cue variable by interacting it with a thermometer score his respondents gave regarding the cue-giver.
We employ a quasi-experimental test of our hypothesis by matching respondents in the treatment group (knowledge of a cue) to respondents in the control group (no knowledge of a cue) for both ballot measures. We use a simple matching equation where we predict the propensity of receiving the treatment with common demographic variables (age, income, education, and gender) and related knowledge variables (factual knowledge of the proposition and general political knowledge). To implement our matching equation, we use the GenMatch package for R (see Diamond and Sekhon 2005) as implemented by the MatchIt package for R (Ho et al. 2007 ).
Why use matching in this research? By using matching, we can be certain that our findings are not the result of some covariate imbalance between our groups (those who knew the cue and those who did not). Matching, then, simply ensures that we have covariate balance between our treatment and control conditions. In essence, genetic matching allows us to compare apples to apples, whereas a simple regression compares apples to oranges.
After matching our respondents, we use the following logit regression equation to model each respondent's vote choice on Propositions 4 and 8:
where 
In Equation (1), Pr(y iz = 1) is respondent i's estimated probability of voting in favor (where "1" indicates a "yes" vote and "0" represents a "no" vote) of proposition z. The term n iz defines the model that estimates Pr(y iz = 1). In the model, LIBERAL iz is a dichotomous measure of whether respondent i classifies herself as a Liberal (coded as a "1") or not (coded as a "0"). 
CUE

Results
We discuss our results in four steps. First, we present summary statistics to assess how much voters know about the propositions on the ballot; we also consider source credibility (Iyengar and Valentino 2000; Druckman 2001a; 2001b) and whether the cues we surveyed satisfy the Lupia and McCubbins (1998) conditions necessary for persuasion. Second, we examine the covariate balance of our sample between groups before and after using genetic matching (Diamond and Sekhon 2005) . Third, we then present the regression results using the matched sample as a strict quasi-experimental test of Lupia's theory. Finally, we calculate some marginal effects of information on vote choice.
To begin, we consider how much people knew about the propositions on the ballot. For We turn now to examine the covariate balance between our treatment (knew the cue) and control groups (did not know the cue). As Table 1 shows, we had strong covariate balance between our treatment and control groups for Proposition 4 before matching. After matching, however, we achieve near-perfect covariate balance between the two groups. For Proposition 4, the genetic matching algorithm matched 393 treated observations to 225 control cases, and 207 control cases went unmatched. Concerning Proposition 8, also shown in Table 1 , the covariate differences between groups were somewhat larger before matching, though the two groups were still very similar. Again, after matching, we achieve near-perfect covariate balance between the groups. For this measure, the algorithm matched 551 treatment cases to 214 control cases, and 67 control cases went unmatched. While covariate balance is necessary for a quasi-experimental test, similar distributions in the treatment and control groups are also required to ensure we are comparing similar groups.
Figures 3 and 4 present the distributions of the propensity to receive the treatment for the treatment and control groups both before and after matching for Propositions 4 and 8, respectively. As the figures indicate, the distribution of the control group is remarkably similar to the treatments group for both measures after matching. Figures 3 and 4 , coupled with Table 1 above, assure us that our matching worked well and that our treatment and control groups are comparable. Having established strong covariate balance, we turn now to present the results of our regressions. Table 2 presents the logit regression results for Proposition 4 based on Equation (1) using our matched sample. 4 The regression produces only one significant finding: Liberals who knew that Planned Parenthood opposed the measure were significantly less likely to vote for the measure. Knowledge of the cue, however, did not have a significant effect on either moderates or conservatives. We anticipated that moderates would not be significantly affected by the cue,
given that moderates are a heterogeneous group and will therefore have differing opinions on 4 As is standard, we exclude respondents who have a propensity score to receive the treatment that falls below .1 or is above .9 for both regressions. This results in exclusion of two respondents from the analysis concerning Proposition 4.
Raw Treated
Propensity Score abortion. Whereas liberals and conservatives will be relatively homogeneous with regard to their views on abortion rights, moderates will vary significantly. Thus, it is unsurprising that Planned Parenthood's endorsement would have a significant effect on liberals, but it is surprising that conservatives are not significantly affected by Planned Parenthood's endorsement (though the sign is in the right direction). Finally, age (positive), education (negative), and general political knowledge (negative) are all significant in the expected directions. Three findings emerge from the regression results for Proposition 8 in Table 3 . First, as above, cues matter, but their effect is not absolute. Liberals are more likely to vote against the measure when they know one of the parties' endorsements. Likewise, conservatives are more likely to vote for the measure when they know an endorsement. Again, information does not have a discernable effect on moderates. Second, knowing that Proposition 8 required a simple majority to pass only affected liberals, who were less likely to support the measure. Finally, age (positive), education (negative), income (negative), and general political knowledge (negative) are all significant in the expected directions. To provide context to our regression results, we calculate the predicted probabilities of voting in favor of Propositions 4 and Proposition 8. These predicted probabilities are calculated using Long and Freese's SPost program in STATA (Long and Freese 2005) . We estimate the voting probabilities by varying the effects of ideology and knowledge; we set the covariates (age, education, income, and political knowledge) to their mean value. For liberals, conservatives, and moderates we calculate the baseline voting probability (without any knowledge effects), the effect of knowing a cue by itself, knowing the correct answer to the factual question, and knowing both the cue and having factual knowledge. We provide the predicted voting probabilities for Proposition 8 in Figure 6 . For liberals, knowing either of the cues or that the initiative required a simple majority to pass had a limited but substantively interesting effect on votes when compared to the baseline. These differences, however, are not statistically significant from the liberal baseline (though liberals who knew the cue had a significantly different point estimate when compared to moderates). Direct democracy may also be asking too much from uninformed voters and selfidentified moderates. As our data revealed, a significant number of voters did not know much about the constitutional amendments that lay before them. Almost 50 percent of the voters we surveyed were unaware of the relevant endorsements for Proposition 8 even when the supporting and opposing campaigns spent over $108 million in an effort to educate the electorate. If voters have not learned the trustworthy endorsements for the ballot measures they face and they lack factual information about the proposed policy change, it is unclear how these uninformed voters are making decisions, let alone if they are making "good" decisions.
Understanding how moderates make decisions remains a significant challenge. Indeed, the moderate's voting calculus with regard to ballot measures is a mystery: We cannot predict the direction of their vote on the most ballot measures because moderates vary in their support for most issues. This is especially problematic for initiatives and referenda given that moderates are swing voters who are, in essence, deciding the outcomes of important constitutional questions. While we may not expect moderates to use elite endorsements at a high rate (typically, they are the least informed about politics), we cannot test this proposition without new data and a revised voting model. Understanding how all voters make their decisions on ballot measures is exceedingly important since it is now commonplace for ballot measures to restrict or expand the rights to all citizens within a particular state.
If cues help some voters make decisions in direct democracy, how can we increase their use and effectiveness? The answer, we argue, is a simple policy change: Institutionalize cues by including information about a proposition's prominent endorsers and opponents on the ballot itself. Adopting this policy would be analogous to having party identification and incumbency labels that appear on the ballot for many elected offices. By providing a candidate's party label and incumbency status, voters can make inferences about a candidate based on their own evaluations of that candidate's political party and past job performance (see, e.g., Fiorina 1981; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989) . Voters can perform these evaluations because they have the information shortcuts available to them on the ballot when they make their choice. Including elite endorsements on the ballot itself would also help establish trust between the cue-giver and the voter because, similar to a candidate's reported party identification, the information shortcuts on the ballot will have the credibility of an official announcement from the state.
Political parties are the obvious choice for potential endorsers to include on the ballot. If both parties take a position on a ballot measure -as was the case with Proposition 8 -those positions should be printed on the ballot. If the parties take no position on a proposition, that information should be made available as well. Endorsements, however, need not be limited to the two major parties: a number of trustworthy and knowledgeable cue-givers are available (e.g., prominent interest groups). Including relevant endorsers and opponents on the ballot for initiatives and referenda would allow voters to use their evaluations of those cue-providers to make more informed choices at the point of decision.
Why include cues on the ballot itself? Ballot titles and summaries may not be providing voters with enough information. In California, for instance, ballot titles and summaries provided on the ballot are somewhat meager, as it cannot exceed 100 words. The goal of the title and summary, according to California law, is to describe the core of the initiative or referendum (California Election Code § 9004). The Legislative Analyst also includes a short fiscal impact statement, which often indicate a large degree of uncertainty. While the fiscal impact statements may be somewhat useful, the summaries, we suspect, may not provide enough information to voters. If, for example, voters had not read or heard anything about the measure before casting their ballot as Matsusaka (2005) believes, they must rely on a short summary to inform them about a complex and often long policy proposal. Placing elite endorsements on the ballot would supply voters with vital and potentially decision-improving information that is readily available.
In sum, including cues on the ballot for every proposition would increase awareness of the relevant endorsers and opponents for individuals who were not aware of them before Election Day, and it would remind knowledgeable voters to consider the cues when they mark their choice. Together, this should increase the likelihood that voters would use information shortcuts to make informed decisions.
